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INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AT A CROSSROADS:
WHY HISTORY MATTERS
Peter K Yu *
It is part of life and business to question ourselves about
where the future is leading. Where possible, we all make an
attempt at it. However, predicting the future must
necessarily be based on knowledge of the past. Future
events must have some connection with past events, and this
is where historians come in .... Historians can attempt to
uncover those elements of the past which are important, and
identify the trends and the problems.
-Eric Hobsbawm l
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In his novel 1984, Orwell wrote that those who control the
present control the past and those who control the past
control the future .... Thus people(s) in the present need
antecedents to locate themselves now and legitimate their
ongoing and future ways of living .... Thus people(s)
literally feel the need to root themselves today and
tomorrow in their yesterdays.
-Keith Jenkins
2
The past is not discovered or found. It is created and
represented by the historian as a text, which in turn is
consumed by the reader. Traditional history is dependent
for its power to explain like the statue pre-existing in the
marble .... But this is not the only history we can have.
By exploring how we represent the relationship between
ourselves and the past we may see ourselves not as
detached observers of the past but... participants in its
creation. The past is complicated and difficult enough
without the self-deception that the more we struggle with
the evidence the closer we get to the past.
-Alun Munslow
3
Intellectual property is at a crossroads today. As the
Commission on Ifitellectual Property Rights noted in its final report,
"[o]ver the last twenty years or so there has been an unprecedented
increase in the level, scope, territorial extent and role of IP right
protection."4 From the rapid privatization and commodification of
information to the creation of property rights in bioengineered
microorganisms and lifeforms, recent developments in the
intellectual property field have sparked major controversies, calling
into questions our values, worldviews, and the way society protects
1. ERIC HOBSBAWM, ON THE EDGE OF THE NEW CENTURY 1 (Allan
Cameron trans., 2000).
2. KEITH JENKINS, RE-THNKING HISTORY 22 (1991).
3. ALUN MUNSLOW, DECONSTRUCTING HISTORY 178 (1997).
4. COMM'N ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS, INTEGRATING
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY: REPORT OF
THE COMMISSION ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 2 (2002).
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and incentivizes human creations and innovations. To grapple with
these difficult questions, courts and commentators have turned to
history for guidance and support.
A case in point is the recent United States Supreme Court
decision of Eldred v. Ashcroft, 5 to which this Symposium owed its
origin. Writing for the majority, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg looked
to history to determine whether the Copyright Clause empowers
Congress to extend the terms of existing copyrights. As she
observed, "History reveals an unbroken congressional practice of
granting to authors of works with existing copyrights the benefit of
term extensions so that all under copyright protection will be
governed evenhandedly under the same regime." 6  In addition,
Professors Tyler Ochoa and Mark Rose submitted an amici curiae
brief in support of the petitioners' positions, documenting the British
experience with patents and copyrights prior to the framing of the
United States Constitution and the influence this experience had on
the Framers and the drafting of the Copyright and Patent Clause.
7
Many legal commentators also examined the history of the Clause
both before and after the Eldred decision.8 All of a sudden, courts,
litigants, and commentators seem to have rediscovered the use of
history in intellectual property jurisprudence.
History has many functions. For the originalists, it informs the
interpretation of existing law and provides the contexts needed to
5. 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
6. Id. at 200.
7. Brief Amici Curiae Tyler T. Ochoa, Mark Rose, Edward C.
Walterscheid, The Organization of American Historians, and H-Law:
Humanities and Social Sciences Online, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186
(2003) (No. 01-618). The brief was subsequently expanded in Tyler T. Ochoa
& Mark Rose, The Anti-Monopoly Origins of the Patent and Copyright Clause,
49 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y U.S.A. 675 (2002).
8. See, e.g., LYMAN RAY PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE (1968); EDWARD C. WALTERSCHEID, THE NATURE OF THE
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CLAUSE: A STUDY IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
(2002); Tyler T. Ochoa, Patent and Copyright Term Extension and the
Constitution: A Historical Perspective, 49 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 19
(2001); L. Ray Patterson & Craig Joyce, Copyright in 1791: An Essay
Concerning the Founders' View of the Copyright Power Granted to Congress
in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the U.S. Constitution, 52 EMORY L.J. 909
(2003); Malla Pollack, What Is Congress Supposed to Promote?: Defining
"Progress " in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the United States Constitution,
or Introducing the Progress Clause, 80 NEB. L. REV. 754 (2001).
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evaluate how and whether courts should apply existing law to
unforeseen circumstances, such as those concerning the Internet, new
communications technologies, and biotechnological innovations. For
example, "a judge might turn to [legislative history] in search of the
subjective legislative intent, or to divine the overall legislative
purpose, or to 'imaginatively reconstruct' how the legislature would
have answered a particular question, or to determine whether a word
was used according to its ordinary or technical meaning." 9 Even for
those who do not believe in originalism, history provides the needed
backgrounds and contexts to evaluate whether an existing law or
policy was appropriately designed for the newly-perceived problems.
By bringing insights or drawing lessons from the past, history thus
enables judges and policy makers to find more attractive solutions
and make better decisions.
Moreover, the study of history itself can result in the finding of
new facts and ideas that challenge our understanding of the existing
world. Consider, for example, the wheel, which has been
"[p]opularly perceived as one of the oldest and most important
inventions in the history of the human race."10  Although most
people consider the use of wheeled transportation "a signal of
civilization,"' "1 historical records seem to suggest otherwise, calling
into question some of our traditional wisdom and unquestioned
assumptions. As Professor George Basalla noted insightfully in The
Evolution of Technology:
Mesoamericans did not use wheeled vehicles because it was
not feasible to do so given the topographical features of
their land and the animal power available to them. Wheeled
transport depends on adequate roads, a difficult requirement
in a region noted for its dense jungles and rugged
landscape. Large draft animals capable of pulling heavy
wooden vehicles, were also needed, but Mesoamericans had
no domesticated animals that could be put to that use. Men
and women of Mexico and Central America traveled along
trails and over rough terrain carrying loads on their backs.
9. EVA H. HANKS ET AL., ELEMENTS OF LAW 357-58 (1994).
10. GEORGE BASALLA, THE EVOLUTION OF TECHNOLOGY 7 (1988).
11. Id. at 8.
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It was unnecessary to build roads for these human carriers
of goods.
An even more persuasive case can be made against the
universal superiority and applicability of the wheel by
returning to its place of origin in the Near East. Between
the third and seventh centuries A.D., the civilizations of the
Near East and North Africa gave up wheeled vehicular
transportation and adopted a more efficient and speedier
way of moving goods and people: They replaced the wagon
and cart with the camel. This deliberate rejection of the
wheel in the very region of its invention lasted for more
than one thousand years. It came to an end only when
major European powers, advancing their imperialistic
schemes for the Near East, reintroduced the wheel. 12
According to Professor Basalla:
The more we learn about the wheel, the clearer it becomes
that its history and influence have been distorted by the
extraordinary attention paid to it in Europe and the United
States .... Th[at] history... began as a search for a
significant technological advancement that was produced in
response to a universal human need. It has ended with the
wheel seen as a culture-bound invention whose meaning
and impact have been exaggerated in the West.' 
3
Titled "Intellectual Property at a Crossroads: The Use of the Past
in Intellectual Property Jurisprudence," this Symposium brings
together six intellectual property law scholars to explore the use of
history in intellectual property laws and jurisprudence. In the first
article, Everything Old Is New Again: Dickens to Digital,14 Professor
Joseph Beard compares the copyright issues we face in the digital
world today with those confronting Charles Dickens and his
contemporaries in the analog world of the nineteenth century. The
first half of his article focuses on the similarities between the
nineteenth-century concept of "re-origination" and the late twentieth-
century concept of "transformative use," which the United States
12. Id. at9-11.
13. Id. at 11.
14. Joseph J. Beard, Everything Old Is New Again: Dickens to Digital, 38
Loy. L.A. L. REv. 19 (2004).
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Supreme Court emphasized in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.'
5
The article discusses the litigation concerning The Wind Done Gone,
a parody of Margaret Mitchell's Gone with the Wind, and the dispute
between Chapman & Hall and Edward Lloyd over Charles Dickens'
The Pickwick Papers. By exploring how judges in The Wind Done
Gone case would have resolved The Pickwick Papers dispute, and
vice versa, the article illustrates, interestingly, a remarkable
consistency of Anglo-American copyright jurisprudence.
In the second half of the article, Professor Beard focuses on the
copyright term extension bill pushed by Serjeant Thomas Noon
Talfourd, the eighteenth-century Sonny Bono and a close personal
friend of Charles Dickens. By comparing key testimonies and
commentaries on the Talfourd Act of 1842 and the Sonny Bono
Copyright Term Extension Act, 16 Professor Beard demonstrates the
striking similarities between arguments made by both proponents and
opponents of the two pieces of legislation. Reminding us "there are
lessons to be learned from days long gone,"'17 he closes the article
with the eloquent and widely-cited speech Lord Thomas Babington
Macaulay delivered in the House of Commons on February 5,
1841.18
In Copyright and the Victorian Internet: Telegraphic Property
Laws in Colonial Australia,'9 Professor Lionel Bently ventures
beyond intellectual property law to look at its close cousin,
information law. The article traces the successful enactment of the
Victorian Telegraphic Messages Act in 1871 and the Telegraphic
15. 510 U.S. 569 (1994). In Campbell, the Court stated:
Although such transformative use is not absolutely necessary for a
finding of fair use, the goal of copyright, to promote science and the
arts, is generally furthered by the creation of transformative works.
Such works thus lie at the heart of the fair use doctrine's guarantee of
breathing space within the confines of copyright, and the more
transformative the new work, the less will be the significance of other
factors, like commercialism, that may weigh against a finding of fair
use.
Id. at 579 (citations omitted).
16. Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998) (codified as amended at 17
U.S.C. § 304 (2000)).
17. Beard, supra note 14, at 19.
18. Id. at 68-69.
19. Lionel Bently, Copyright and the Victorian Internet.: Telegraphic
Property Laws in ColonialAustralia, 38 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 71 (2004).
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Acts of Western and South Australia in 1872 and rehearses
arguments for and against the extension of protection to cover news
sent by telegraph. The article also examines why similar laws were
rejected in New South Wales, Tasmania, and Queensland and the
impact of telegraphic property laws in and outside Australia.
Unlike Professor Beard, Professor Bently does not seek to draw
any historical lessons from the past; indeed, he finds it "virtually
impossible.., to draw any conclusions as to the impact of
[telegraphic property] laws.",20 Nevertheless, he suggests that the
discussion of these laws will enable us to better understand our own
condition and become sensitive, while being simultaneously distant
from, the legal developments we encounter today. As he maintains:
[The article's] purpose is not to teach any particular lesson.
Instead [it] is based on the premise that history rarely, if
ever, reveals immutable laws about human behavior, or
about the necessary relationships between practices and
ideas, or between technology and the law. Rather, stories
from the past, such as this one, are resources which enable
us to understand our own condition. Knowledge of these
stories from the past can provide us with a sensitivity to,
and simultaneously a distance from, the types of
developments taking place today. The past provides us with
some kind of perspective from which to evaluate the
present. We can make this evaluation through careful
comparison of past circumstances.., with those of the
present. Such a comparison enables us to establish
similarities and to identify differences between past
experiences and current developments or proposals. It is
through these processes that historical method affords us a
particular technique for understanding the seemingly
intractable challenges we face today.
21
At the end, the article notes three similarities between the story
of telegraphic property laws and the concerns raised by the Internet
and digitization. First, both stories concern how to "ensure that
people will put effort into the creation and dissemination of
20. Id. at 163.
21. Id. at 171-72 (footnote omitted).
Fall 2004]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LA WREVIEW
information products through new electronic distribution systems."22
Second, the two stories prompt a reconsideration of the appropriate
"units" of protection or "objects" of property-for example, whether
data should be protected per se. In both cases, "[t]echnological
developments, more accurately particular social and cultural uses of
technology, have caused us to rethink how properties are mapped."
23
Third, the two stories provide illustrations of legislative captures by
interest groups and reflect strong reactions to claims of property in
information.
Notwithstanding these similarities, the two stories differ in two
significant ways. First, while the problems raised by the telegraph
required national-and initially state-wide--solutions, the problems
of the Internet and digitization require global solutions. Policy
makers therefore need to be cautious about adopting these solutions,
as globally-imposed one-size-fits-all solutions may take away
opportunities for legal experimentation in response to newly
perceived problems. Such solutions also may result in undesirable
legislation in countries or regions having different commercial
structures, traditions, rivalries, and politics.
Second, while the response to the telegraph elicited
technologically-specific solutions, the Internet and digitization have
called for the development of technology-neutral solutions. For
example, European database laws apply to all databases, electronic
or otherwise, while recent British law has replaced a technologically-
specific "broadcasting right" with a general "communication right."
Ultimately, this drive for technologically-neutral solutions, as
Professor Bently argues, will create laws of unintended
consequences that bring "perfectly acceptable social practices into
the realm of law, unintentionally replacing traditions with
negotiations, and unnecessarily juridifying life worlds." 24  As
Professor Bently concludes aptly, "A review of the story of the
telegraphic property laws reminds us that technological neutrality is
not always ideal."2
22. Id. at 171.
23. Id. at 173.




In The Commodification of Patents 1600-1836: How Patents
Became Rights and Why We Should Care,26 Professor Oren Bracha
tracks the institutional development of patents from their early
origins in England in the late sixteenth century to their ultimate
transformation in the United States in the mid-nineteenth century.
This article traces the origins of the modem framework of patent
rights and illustrates how these rights have been transformed "from
case-specific discretionary policy or political grants of special
privileges designed to achieve individually defined public
purposes, to general standardized legal rights conferring a uniform
set of entitlements whenever predefined criteria are fulfilled.,
27
Although commentators generally trace the origin of American
patent law to the Statute of Monopolies, the article points out that
"the institutional model of patents [at the inception of the American
federal regime] was... quite different from the modem one.",
28
Indeed, it was not until the mid-nineteenth century that patent rights
had acquired their modem form-thanks largely to the Patent Act of
1836, which, as Professor Bracha maintains, "created the first real
examination system in the United States."29 As he observes:
While other parts of patent law were still to undergo
important changes, by the mid-nineteenth century the aspect
of the institutional model of patents surveyed here acquired
its modem form. A new ideology and practice of patents as
individual rights and of the market as the only proper
measure of the invention's value took over. The Patent
Office became the "examiner" of standardized patentability
criteria. Courts assumed the sole role of the enforcers
of patent rights and deserted almost completely any
pretensions some of them had entertained earlier of
engaging in substantive evaluations of the public
desirability of specific inventions or patents. The
26. Oren Bracha, The Commodification of Patents 1600-1836: How
Patents Became Rights and Why We Should Care, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 177
(2004).
27. Id. at 181.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 235.
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conversion of patent privileges to patent rights was
complete.
30
Professor Bracha concludes his article by discussing some
possible implications of the historical development of the modem
patent rights. As he cautions, "the history of Anglo-American
patents should serve as a caveat to lawyers about the legitimate uses
of history and historical materials." 3' This historical account also
may demonstrate the futility of, and perhaps danger in, attempting to
derive from the past direct answers to contemporary legal questions.
According to Professor Bracha:
What early legislators or bureaucrats thought about and did
with respect to patents is often irrelevant for supplying
direct answers to modem questions, given the fact that they
operated in a thoroughly different ideological and practical
context. Worse still, a particular view that made perfect
sense in the world of patent privileges might prove to be of
little coherence or adequacy in the very different context of
patent rights. Hence, at least when attempting to derive
direct answers to current legal questions, past attitudes and
views are likely to be of limited utility.
32
Even for economic historians who are more concerned about the
connection between patents and innovation, Professor Bracha
observes that "the term 'patents' denotes very different sets of
institutional arrangements in different periods." 33 Nevertheless, he
finds it "plausible" that these different institutions have had varying
effects on innovation and welcomes further research that
"integrate[s] the narrative of transformation from patent privileges to
patent rights into the examination of the historical connection
between patents and innovation."
34
Finally, Professor Bracha suggests that the historical account of
the modem transformation of patent rights "may serve to remind us
of those aspects of patents that were obscured and repressed in our
modern consciousness." 35  As he points out, the transformation
30. Id. at 238-39.
31. Id at 239.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 240.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 244.
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process has obscured the political, cultural, and social dimensions of
patent rights and has reduced them to "standardized general rights
[that are] legitimized by the claim of the universal patent regime to
maximizing social utility." 36  To avoid ideological biases and a
narrow focus on the utilitarian aspects of patent rights, one therefore
must have a better appreciation of the historical roots of patent rights.
After all, as the article points out:
[T]raditional patent privileges were openly political. They
were political decisions of the sovereign, exercising its
discretion and making case-specific determinations in the
name of the public good. The legitimacy of each patent
grant was dependent on the plausibility and legitimacy of
the governmental assertion attached to it that, taking all
relevant considerations and interests into account, the grant
served the public good. Moreover, the "public good" in this
context was not limited to a narrow conception of economic
or technological innovation. Patent privileges existed in an
age with no sharp distinction between "economic" (in the
modem sense) and "other" public considerations.
37
In Digital Property /Analog History,38 Professor Susan Scafidi
questions whether the use of the past in American intellectual
property jurisprudence remains tethered to the nineteenth-century
view of history, which tends "to emphasise certain principles of
progress in the past and to produce a story which is the ratification if
not the glorification of the present." 39 As she explains, "[h]istorians
are warned to exercise caution not only with respect to anachronistic
interpretation of the past, but also in regard to claims of linear,
teleological movement and sequential improvement. ' 4° Thus, the
article underscores the need to reevaluate some of the underlying
assumptions of intellectual property jurisprudence in light of
developments in the field of history.
36. Id. at 243.
37. Id. at 243 (footnotes omitted).
38. Susan Scafidi, Digital Property lAnalog History, 38 Loy. L.A. L. REv.
245 (2004).
39. HERBERT BUTrERFIELD, THE WHIG INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY, at v
(Norton 1965) (1931), quoted in Scafidi, supra note 38, at 246.
40. Scafidi, supra note 38, at 246.
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Professor Scafidi illustrates her arguments with two stories. The
first story focuses on the United States Supreme Court case of
Marconi Wireless Telegraph Co. of America v. United States,
4 1
which involved patents used in the early radio industry. Using
insights from scientific, social, cultural, and political history, this
story illustrates how "historical methods could benefit the study and
practice of intellectual property law.",42 The story also demonstrates
the shortcomings of existing patent jurisprudence, which focuses
unduly on the romantic concept of inventorship and "operates via
largely unquestioned assumptions regarding factual truth and
objectivity.,
43
The second story concerns the copyright dispute between
Barbara Chase-Riboud, a prize-winning African-American novelist,
and Dreamworks, Inc. over her historical account of the slave ship
Amistad. In this story, Professor Scafidi illustrates how existing
copyright jurisprudence had clung to the anachronistic "scientific"
approach of history, which assumed that historians were engaged in a
search of objective truth. As she explains:
Historians no longer unanimously subscribe to the belief
that they are engaged in a search for objective truth, and
few would claim to discern universal laws of history. The
proportion of historical research that yields concrete,
unassailable facts is dwarfed by the amount of expressive
material generated by historians. Even the names, dates,
and places that apparently comprise the most
straightforward part of the historical record are often written
in pencil-especially if the handwriting is not one's own
but that of a colleague in the field.44
By clinging to an anachronistic historical tradition, courts
therefore have ignored the many choices historians had to make
concerning what to include in the narrative and how to characterize
or portray the past. Existing copyright jurisprudence also devalues
the industrious efforts undertaken by historians to generate historical
narratives and theories, which often require "years of advanced
study, months spent in dusty archives scattered around the world, and
41. 320 U.S. 1 (1943).
42. Scafidi, supra note 38, at 258.
43. Id. at 246.
44. Id. at 263 (footnote omitted).
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countless solitary hours reading crumbling old tomes, faded letters,
or endless spirals of microfilm. 45
Professor Scafidi concludes her article by calling for a more
contemporary understanding of the historical profession and the need
to incorporate this new understanding into our intellectual property
jurisprudence. As she explains:
Intellectual property law.., should not be content to settle
for an analog version of history. Like other areas of
jurisprudence, intellectual property must instead incorporate
a useable theory of the past informed by current
scholarship. Only then can legal practice begin to reflect a
more subtle understanding of history as both an arbiter and
an object of human creativity.
46
According to Professor Scafidi, modem historiographical trends not
only can affect the courts' treatment of the past, as in the case of
contested inventions or works of history, but also challenge the basic
notions of progress and creativity that underlie the development of
existing intellectual property law and jurisprudence.
In Intellectual Property and Public Policy in Historical
Perspective: Contestation and Settlement,47 Professor Susan Sell
offers a critical history of intellectual property rights, discussing "key
moments in the development of intellectual property law when
particular ideas and economic circumstances converged to privilege
particular agents and alter institutions. ' '48 As she maintains, "the
history of intellectual property rights is [essentially] a history of
contestation [in which] the inherent tensions in the idea of
intellectual property recurrently resurface under philosophical,
technological, or institutional pressure."49 According to Professor
Sell, what ultimately constitutes property, or piracy, "depends upon
time, place, geography, constellation of interests, degree of
competition present, stage of economic development, and power."
50
45. Id. at261.
46. Id. at 265.
47. Susan K. Sell, Intellectual Property and Public Policy in Historical
Perspective: Contestation and Settlement, 38 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 267 (2004).
48. Id. at 268.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 267-68.
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Like Professor Scafidi, Professor Sell -acknowledges that
"[h]istorical change is not linear... [and] is contingent, rife with
unintended consequences, path dependence, and awkward patches in
which institutions no longer serve their original aims.' As she
explains:
The history of intellectual property protection reveals a
complex yet identifiable relationship between three major
factors. First, it reveals shifting conceptions of ownership,
authorship, and invention. These ideas denote what
"counts" as property, and who shalltlay claim to it. Second,
this history reflects changes in the organization of
innovation and the production and - distribution of
technology. Third, it reflects institutional change with these
shifting ideational and material forces.
Legal institutionalization of these changes in law alters
power relationships and inevitably privileges some at the
expense of others. Property rights both are situated within
broader historical structures of global capitalism and serve
to either reproduce or transform -these structures. Particular
historical structures privilege some agents over others, and
these agents can appeal to institutions to increase their
power.
Depending on the world in which one lives, piracy may be
construed as theft or as an important tool of public policy. 52
Professor Sell begins 'her' list of contestations and settlements
with British inventor Richard Arkwright, whose story highlighted the
contestation between patentees and users of patented technologies.
She then examines the diverse intellectual property protection
offered by countries in the nineteenth century, the resolution of the
patent controversy of 1870-1875 (which Professor Sell considers "a
key settlement"), and the multilateral institutionalization of
intellectual property rights under the Berne and Paris Conventions.
She also discusses Thomas Edison's "predatory patenting strategies,"
the rise of the new German business model, the emergence of patent
cartels, and the transformation of the United States' position from
ambivalence and skepticism about intellectual property protection
51. Id. at 268.
52. Id. at 267.
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and monopoly power to vigorous advocacy for dramatically
expanded global property rights. Professor Sell closes her list with
the multilateral intellectual property settlement in the World Trade
Organization in the early 1990s and the emerging contestation in its
wake.
Like Professor Beard, Professor Sell finds that the recent
developments in intellectual property policy have demonstrated that
"everything old is new again." Although the current era, as the
article notes, has been widely criticized for its broad property rights
and heavy economic concentration in leading industrial sectors, these
characteristics were also present in the nineteenth century. Indeed,
as the article demonstrates, intellectual property rights "have evolved
as a result of shifting conceptions of property rights, technological
change, and institutionalization of legal settlements... [, and t]he
mobilization ofprivate actors has played an important role in shaping
this evolution.
' 54
At the end of the article, Professor Sell expresses concern about
how "the baseline for property rights has moved quite far in the
direction of private reward over public access" in recent years.
55
Thus, she calls for the mobilization of private actors to protest the
broad expansion of property rights interests and to restore the
historical balance in the intellectual property regime. As she
concludes somewhat optimistically:
Each new round of contestation and settlement produces
new winners and losers. History has shown that depending
on how well mobilized and badly threatened the losers are,
they can rise up to challenge the settlement. Sometimes
they prevail, which helps to redress egregious imbalances.
Thus, history provides some hope for a more balanced
future for intellectual property rights.56
In the final article of this Symposium, Currents and
Crosscurrents in the International Intellectual Property Regime,57 I
trace the historical development of the international intellectual
53. Id. at 319.
54. Id. at 321.
55. Id. at 320.
56. Id. at321.
57. Peter K. Yu, Currents and Crosscurrents in the International
Intellectual Property Regime, 38 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 323 (2004).
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property regime and seek to address concerns about the "new world
intellectual property order" raised by commentators and intellectual
property rights holders. While commentators sympathetic to less
developed countries fear that the increasing use of bilateral free trade
agreements and technological protection measures will roll back the
substantive and strategic gains made by less developed countries
during the negotiation of the TRIPS Agreement, many intellectual
property rights holders feel threatened by the recent developments in
the international arena, such as the establishment of the Declaration
on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, the emphasis of global
public access rights in the World Summit on the Information Society,
the adoption of the Geneva Declaration on the Future of WIPO, and
the creation of the WIPO Development Agenda.
This article argues that the recent developments are neither new
nor surprising, but rather reflect a recurring conflict and interaction
between currents of multilateralism and the resistance to these
currents, which I term the "crosscurrents of resistance."58 While the
currents push the international intellectual property regime toward
uniformity and greater harmonization, the crosscurrents protect the
autonomy of the member states and their ability to experiment with
legal rules and innovation systems. By bringing together these
currents and crosscurrents, this article demonstrates that the
international intellectual property regime remains an ongoing project
that provides opportunities and crises for both developed and less
developed countries, as well as for both rights holders and individual
end users.
This article begins by discussing how countries became
dissatisfied with the use of bilateral agreements to protect authors
and inventors in foreign countries. It traces the origins of the Berne
and Paris Conventions, the TRIPS Agreement, and the 1996 WIPO
Internet Treaties and discusses how the international intellectual
property regime came to its current form. The article then explores
five crosscurrents that have emerged and influenced the international
intellectual property regime in recent years: reciprocization,
diversification, bilateralism, non-nationalization, and abandonment.
It suggests that these crosscurrents may undercut international
harmonization efforts and will pose new challenges to the existing
58. Id. at 328.
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regime. The article concludes by providing observations in five
different areas: bargaining frameworks, regime development, global
lawmaking, harmonization efforts, and judicial trends.
More than eight decades ago, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes
remarked famously, "a page of history is worth a volume of 
logic." 59
If Justice Holmes is right, these six articles will provide volumes of
logic that inform the current intellectual property debate, draw
insights and lessons from the past, and offer guidance for the future
development of intellectual property laws and jurisprudence. I hope
you will enjoy this Symposium.
59. New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921).
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